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OPINION OF THE COURT  
             
 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This case comes before this court on an application of the 
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") to enforce 
an Order against Michael Konig t/a Nursing Center at Vineland 
("the Home") to cease and desist from engaging in unfair labor 
practices.  The Board had issued a Decision and Order concluding 
that the Home had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4) and (5) of 
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(1), 
(3), (4) & (5), by committing unfair labor practices against 
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several licensed practical nurses ("LPNs") engaged in union 
activities.  The Home contests this Decision and Order on the 
ground that an intervening Supreme Court case, NLRB v. Health 
Care & Retirement Corp. of America,    U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 1778 
(1994), overturned Board precedent, rendering LPNs supervisory 
employees who are not covered by the NLRA.  Because the Home 
waived this contention by failing to raise it in the prior 
proceedings, we deny review and grant enforcement. 
 
I. 
 The Home is a long-term nursing home in Vineland, New 
Jersey.  In June 1992, the Communications Workers of America, 
Local 1040, AFL-CIO ("CWA" or "the union") began seeking to 
organize the LPNs working at the Home.0  Several LPNs became 
interested in the union.  The union filed a petition for 
representation of the Home's LPNs on June 8, 1992.  
 On July 8, 1992, the Board held a representation hearing to 
address three questions:  (1) whether the LPNs were already 
represented by another union; (2) whether the unit was 
appropriately limited to LPNs; and (3) whether three of the LPNs 
were "charge nurses" and thus supervisors within the meaning of 
                                                           
0The following brief summary of the facts in this case is based 
on the findings of the Board in its Decision and Order issued in 
Michael Konig t/a Nursing Center at Vineland, 314 NLRB 947 
(1994).  The Home has not raised any objections with respect to 
the Board's factual findings, nor did it object to the Board's 
conclusion that these facts constituted unfair labor practices 
under the Act.  They have thus waived any objection as to the 
Board's findings, see NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Etc., 
691 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir. 1982), and we will accept them as 
true. 
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section 2(11) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).  The Regional 
Director found in favor of the union on all three issues and 
issued a Decision and Direction of Election on September 17, 
1992.  The election was conducted, and on October 27, 1992 the 
union was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of 
the LPNs.  
 Throughout this period, particularly following the CWA's 
filing of its representation petition and around the time of the 
representation hearing, the LPNs' unionization efforts met with 
serious impediments by the Home management.  The LPNs were 
threatened, harassed, and some eventually were terminated as a 
result of their union activities. 
 The union filed unfair labor practice charges against the 
Home, alleging that the Home had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), 
(4) and (5) of the NLRA in July, August and September of 1992. 
The case was heard during March and May of 1993.  On August 31, 
1994, the NLRB issued a Decision and Order.  Michael Konig t/a 
Nursing Center at Vineland, 314 NLRB 947 (1994).  The Board found 
that the Home had discouraged employees from engaging in union 
activities and had discharged three LPNS and reduced the pay of a 
fourth because of their union activities and had thus engaged in 
unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA.  The Board 
accordingly ordered the Home to reinstate the three who had been 
terminated to their former positions or substantially similar 
positions and to make them whole for losses incurred, and to 
restore pay to the one whose salary had been reduced, including 
backpay.  The Order also required the Home to bargain with the 
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CWA as the exclusive representative of the employees in the LPN 
unit on terms and conditions of employment.  It is this Decision 
and Order that the Board seeks to enforce before this Court. 
 Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, after the case had been heard 
but before the Board had issued its opinion, the Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Health Care & Retirement Corp., in which 
it held that nurses who engage in patient care are acting "in the 
interest of the employer" and therefore may be supervisors within 
the meaning of the NLRA.  NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 
114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).0   Based on this Supreme Court decision, 
the Home has since refused to bargain with the CWA on the ground 
that the LPNs are supervisors not protected by the NLRA.   
 In an action separate from the instant one, the union filed 
another unfair labor practice charge for refusal to bargain with 
the LPNs in July 1994, and a hearing was held on this issue in 
February 1995.  Prodded by the decision in Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. the Home presented evidence that the LPNs were 
supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA and therefore 
unprotected by the Act.  On May 12, 1995, the Administrative Law 
Judge ("ALJ") issued a Decision and Order in Case No. 4-CA-22933, 
concluding that the Home was barred from raising the objection to 
the representation unit on the basis that the LPNs were 
                                                           
0As explained, infra, the Supreme Court did not alter the Board's 
statutory interpretation of the other two prongs of the 
definition of supervisor, i.e. that (1) the individual engages in 
at least one of twelve designated supervisory activities; and (2) 
that the individual exercises independent judgment in performing 
these activities.  See Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S.Ct. 
at 1780.  
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supervisors at this unfair labor practices hearing when they had 
not raised this issue at the original representation proceeding, 
and that, in any event, the evidence introduced at the original 
representation hearing and the findings from that hearing did not 
support the contention that the LPNs were supervisors, even under 
Health Care & Retirement Corp.   The Home was thus ordered to 
bargain with the union as the representative of the certified LPN 
unit.  The Board later affirmed the ALJ's decision, accepting its 
rulings, findings and conclusions and explicitly noting that 
there was "no showing that the LPNs . . . exercise independent 
judgment in performing" assignments and that Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. was therefore inapplicable.  Michael Konig t/a 
Nursing Center at Vineland, 318 NLRB No. 64 at 1 n.1 (1995). This 
court summarily denied the Home's petition to review this 
decision and granted the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement on 
December 14, 1995.  Konig v. NLRB, No. 95-3507 (December 14, 
1995) (order).     
  
II. 
 The NLRB had jurisdiction to hear the unfair labor practice 
proceeding under section 10(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). 
This court has jurisdiction over the Board's appeal for 
enforcement of the Order under section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 
U.S.C. § 160(e), and over the Home's petition for review of the 
Order under section 10(f).  29 U.S.C. § 160(f). 
 We will uphold the Board's findings of fact if they are 
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a 
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whole.  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 485-87 
(1951).  Our review of questions of law is plenary.  Tubari Ltd. 
v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 
III. 
 The NLRA does not provide protection for individuals who are 
supervisors within the meaning of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §152(3); 
see also Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Center v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 
626, 629 (8th Cir. 1991) ("By excluding 'supervisors' from the 
definition of 'employee,' § 2(3) of the Act . . . excludes 
supervisors from protection under the Act.").  Section 2(11) of 
the NLRA defines "supervisor" as follows: 
any individual having authority, in the interest of the 
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, 
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other 
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust 
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such 
action, if in connection with the foregoing the 
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine 
or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent 
judgment. 
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (emphasis added).  An individual is a 
supervisor within the meaning of the statute, then, if she (1) 
has the authority to engage in one of the twelve listed 
activities; (2) exercises that authority with "the use of 
independent judgment;" and (3) holds the authority "in the 
interest of the employer."  Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 
S. Ct. at 1780.   
 Prior to Health Care & Retirement Corp., the Board 
consistently had held that "'a nurse's direction of less skilled 
employees, in the exercise of professional judgment incidental to 
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the treatment of patients, is not authority exercised "in the 
interest of the employer."'"  Id. (citation omitted).  See, e.g., 
Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 NLRB 491, 493-94 (1993); Beverly 
Enters., Alabama Inc., 304 NLRB 861, 864 (1991) ("[W]e further 
find that assignment and direction of nurses aides' work by LPNs 
is routine and primarily in connection with patient care and does 
not establish that the LPNs are supervisors."); Phelps Community 
Medical Center, 295 NLRB 486, 490 (1989) (same); The Ohio Masonic 
Home, 295 NLRB 390, 395 (1989) (LPNs not supervisors because 
their direction of aides' work was done in "connection with 
patient care and did not go beyond into 'personnel authority 
which more directly promote the interests of the employer and 
which is not motivated by patient care needs.'") (citation 
omitted). 
 The Supreme Court overturned the Board's statutory 
interpretation in its opinion in Health Care & Retirement Corp, 
114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).  There, the Court concluded that 
"[p]atient care is the business of a nursing home, and it follows 
that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who are 
the employer's customers, is in the interest of the employer." 
Id. at 1782.  It thus found that four LPNs who performed some of 
the twelve activities listed in the statute in the interest of 
patient care necessarily did so "in the interest of the employer" 
and were therefore supervisors under the Act.  Id. at 1781, 1785. 
A.    
 The Home argues that in light of this recent decision, this 
court should deny enforcement of the Board's Order because it 
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renders the LPNs in the instant case supervisors and thus not 
entitled to the protection of the Act.  Initially, we emphasize 
that Health Care & Retirement Corp. did not rule that all LPNs 
are necessarily supervisors; rather it ruled that all LPNs who 
perform one of the twelve tasks listed in section 2(11), 
exercising their own independent judgment and in the interest of 
patient care, are supervisors.  Id.   
 The Home claims that the record from the hearing before the 
administrative law judge in Michael Konig t/a Nursing Center at 
Vineland, Case No. 4-CA-22933, the action filed by the union in 
July of 1994 for the Home's refusal to bargain, demonstrates that 
the LPNs are supervisors under Health Care & Retirement Corp.  We 
first note that case No. 4-CA-22933 was not consolidated with the 
instant case and is thus not presently before this panel on 
appeal.0   Therefore, we decline to consider the record from that 
case in this appeal.  In any event, the Board in case No. 4-CA-
22933 ruled that the record failed to demonstrate that the LPNs 
were supervisors, even in light of Health Care & Retirement 
Corp.,0 and this court has affirmed the Board.0  Thus, even were 
                                                           
0On October 3, 1995, this court denied a motion to consolidate 
the instant appeal with the appeal from the Board's decision in 
case No. 4-CA-22933.  Case No. 4-CA-22933 was then appealed 
separately from the instant matter, and a panel of this court 
denied review and granted enforcement.  See Konig v. NLRB, No. 
95-3507 (December 14, 1995) (order). 
0In affirming the ALJ, the Board specifically noted that any 
evidence in the record suggesting that LPNs assigned and directed 
nurses' aides indicated that such actions were not taken with the 
exercise of independent judgment and therefore Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. was not applicable.  Konig, 318 NLRB No. 64 at 1 
n.1. 
0We note that, because the Board's decision in case No. 4-CA-
22933 was based on alternative grounds (i.e. that the Home waived 
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we to consider the record, it seems doubtful that it would 
support the Home's contentions.     
 Accordingly, there is nothing in the record before us to 
support the Home's contention that the LPNs are supervisors under 
Health Care & Retirement Corp.   However, because we decide, 
infra, that the Home may not object to the Board's Order on the 
ground that the LPNs are supervisors at this juncture in the 
proceeding, it will not be necessary to remand this case to 
determine whether the LPNs are supervisors.   
B. 
 In the original proceeding before the Board, the Home failed 
to raise its current contention that the Act did not apply to the 
LPNs because they were supervisors.0  Section 10(e) of the NLRA 
bars an appellate court from reviewing an issue that was not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
its opportunity to raise this issue and that the record did not 
demonstrate that the LPNS were supervisors), this court's denial 
of review and grant of enforcement in that action does not 
preclude the Home from litigating the supervisory status of the 
LPNs in this action.  The Board's findings regarding the 
supervisory status of the LPNs was not essential to the court's 
judgment.  See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27 cmt. h 
(1982) ("If issues are determined but the judgment is not 
dependent upon the determinations, relitigation of those issues 
in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded.").   
0During the hearing regarding the union's petition for 
representation, the Home did raise the claim that certain LPNs 
were supervisors within the meaning of § 2(11) because they are 
charge 
nurses.  First, we note that this objection was proffered in a 
different proceeding from the one at issue in this appeal for 
review and therefore has no bearing on the instant action. 
Second, even had this objection been raised in the instant 
action, it was only in reference to these three LPNs as charge 
nurses.  The objection did not apply to the remaining LPNs in the 
bargaining unit.  In fact, by claiming supervisory status 
specifically as to these three employees, the Home implicitly 
accepted that the other LPNs were not supervisors. 
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raised in the Board proceeding:  "No objection that has not been 
urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court, 
unless the failure or neglect to urge such exception shall be 
excused because of extraordinary circumstances."  29 U.S.C. 
§160(e).  The Supreme Court has construed this rule strictly.  
See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-66 
(1982).  In Woelke & Romero Framing, the Board had addressed an 
issue sua sponte which had not been raised or argued by either 
party.  When the petitioner sought review of the court of 
appeals' ruling on that issue before the Supreme Court, the Court 
held that under section 10(e), the court of appeals had no 
jurisdiction to consider the question because the petitioner had 
not raised it before the Board.  The Court specifically noted 
that the petitioner "could have objected to the Board's decision 
in a petition for reconsideration or rehearing" and its "failure 
to do so prevents consideration of the question by the courts." 
Id. at 666.  
 The Home argues, however, that the Supreme Court's decision 
in Health Care & Retirement Corp. constitutes an "extraordinary 
circumstance," and that, thus, by the terms of section 10(e) of 
the NLRA, its failure to raise the issue of the LPNs' supervisory 
status before the Board should be excused in this case. 
 The Supreme Court has held on at least one occasion that 
intervening Supreme Court case law may be considered an 
"extraordinary circumstance" under section 10(e), allowing a 
reviewing court to decide an issue that was not raised originally 
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before the Board.  In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the petitioners 
sought to raise for the first time a First Amendment argument  
suggested by a Supreme Court decision, Bill Johnson's Restaurant, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), which had been issued six 
months after the petition for certiorari in Sure-Tan had been 
filed. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896 & n.7 (1984). 
The Court held that it could address this argument even though 
petitioners had not raised it before the Board as required by 
section 10(e) because the intervening and substantial change in 
controlling law occasioned by Bill Johnson's Restaurant qualified 
as an extraordinary circumstance.  Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 896 n.7. 
Thus, it might appear that under Sure-Tan, the Home may raise the 
issue of the LPNs' supervisory status in light of the Health Care 
& Retirement Corp. decision. 
 We find, however, that the facts of the instant matter are 
substantially different from those in Sure-Tan, rendering that 
holding inapplicable to the instant case.  As noted above, the 
decision in Bill Johnson's Restaurant was issued six months after 
the petition for certiorari in Sure-Tan was filed.  The 
petitioner in that case thus could not have raised the issue 
before the Board or even the court of appeals because Bill 
Johnson's Restaurant had not yet been decided.  Here, by 
contrast, the Supreme Court's decision in Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. was issued on May 24, 1994, three months before 
the Board's August 31, 1994 decision in this matter.  Thus, the 
Home easily could have informed the Board of the Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. decision and raised the issue of the LPNs' 
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supervisory status before the Board during those three months. 
Indeed, as made clear in Woelke & Romero Framing, the Home had 
the obligation to raise the argument itself because, even had the 
Board addressed the issue sua sponte, any reviewing court would 
not have had jurisdiction due to the parties' failure to argue 
the point before the Board.  Woelke & Romero Framing, 456 U.S. at 
665-66.  The Home could even have filed a petition for 
reconsideration as permitted by 29 CFR § 102.48(d)(1) following 
the Board's decision.0  Yet, it failed to do so.   
 Unlike in Sure-Tan, then, where the petitioner could not 
have raised the argument suggested by intervening precedent until 
after the petition for certiorari was granted, there were no 
extraordinary circumstances here that would have prevented the 
Home from raising the issue of the LPNs' supervisory status until 
now. The Home's failure to raise the argument, and certainly its 
failure to file a petition for reconsideration, deprives this 
court of jurisdiction to address this question under section 
10(e) of the NLRA.  See Woelke & Romero Framing, 456 U.S. at 665-
66.       
C. 
                                                           
0The text of 29 CFR § 102.48(d)(1) reads, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
A party to a proceeding before the Board may, because 
of extraordinary circumstances, move for 
reconsideration, . . . after the Board decision or 
order.  A motion for reconsideration shall state with 
particularity the material error claimed and with 
respect to any finding of material fact shall specify 
the page of the record relied on.    
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 We now briefly address the question of whether, assuming the 
LPNs at issue in the current action are supervisory personnel, 
the Board had jurisdiction to issue an order compelling 
reinstatement and backpay for supervisors.  We address this issue 
despite our conclusion, supra, that the Home has waived its 
objection because the Home claims that a challenge regarding lack 
of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.  Petitioner's Brief at 
27.   
 The Home's argument fails to recognize the distinction 
between jurisdiction in the sense of the overall authority of the 
Board to hear the case under the NLRA and the jurisdiction of the 
Board to issue an order based upon a factual determination made 
by the Board.  "While the Board's statutory jurisdiction may be 
raised at any time, the facts upon which the Board determines it 
has jurisdiction may be challenged only upon timely exception." 
NLRB v. Peyton Fritton Stores, Inc., 336 F.2d 769, 770 (10th Cir. 
1964) (per curiam); see also Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 472 (9th Cir. 1978).  
 The question of whether the Board had the jurisdiction to 
order reinstatement and backpay to the LPNs rests on the factual 
determination by the Board regarding their supervisory status. 
The Home cannot raise this type of jurisdictional objection for 
the first time before this court absent extraordinary 
circumstances. 
   Indeed, in NLRB v. International Health Care, Inc., 898 F.2d 
501, 506-507 (6th Cir. 1990), the Sixth Circuit arrived at the 
same conclusion when addressing an issue virtually identical to 
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the one currently before us.  There, as here, the court was 
called upon to decide whether the employer could raise an 
objection for the first time that the Board lacked jurisdiction 
to order the employer to bargain with a unit of LPNs because the 
LPNs were supervisors under the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit's 
case NLRB v. Beacon Light, 825 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1987).  The 
court concluded that this sort of jurisdictional challenge based 
on factual determinations could not be raised for the first time 
before the court of appeals.  International Health Care, 898 F.2d 
at 506-07 (citing NLRB v. Ferraro's Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 366 
(6th Cir. 1965) (holding that the Board had jurisdiction to 
determine whether certain workers were "employees" within the 
NLRA and failure of respondent to file timely exception to 
factual determination was not an exceptional circumstance)).   
 We accept the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, as well as the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and conclude that the Home cannot raise 
for the first time before this court an objection to the Board's 
jurisdiction to award backpay and reinstatement to LPNs on the 
theory that they are supervisors.0  
 We further mention here, as an aside, that even if the LPNs 
are in fact supervisors, the Board may still have jurisdiction to 
order their reinstatement and backpay.  First, "it is settled law 
that, notwithstanding the statutory exclusion of supervisors from 
the Act's protection . . . an employer's discharge of a 
supervisor may give rise to an 8(a) (1) violation."  Kenrich 
                                                           
0Judge Alito does not join the portion of Part III of this 
opinion that comes after this footnote. 
16 
Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 893 F.2d 1468, 1475 (3d Cir.), 
enforced on other grounds, 907 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1990) (in banc) 
(citations omitted).  Specifically, the Board has the authority 
"to order the reinstatement of a supervisor whose firing resulted 
not from her own pro-union conduct, but from the employer's 
efforts to thwart the exercise of section 7 rights by protected 
rank-and-file employees."  Kenrich Petrochemicals, 907 F.2d at 
406.      
 We recognize that, assuming arguendo that the LPNs are 
supervisors under Health Care & Retirement Corp., this case does 
not involve the discharge of supervisors for purposes of 
thwarting the exercise of rights of non-supervisory employees. 
Rather, the LPNs in this case were discharged for engaging in 
pro-union activity to protect their own rights.  This court has 
held that in instances where a supervisor is discharged for 
seeking to invoke the Board's protection on her own behalf, the 
Board lacks jurisdiction to grant reinstatement and backpay.  Hi-
Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 917-18 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the reality that, at the time 
that the LPNs were engaged in pro-union activity and the Home 
actively discouraged it, the Home knew that under the Board's 
legal precedent in force at the time, the LPNs were employees not 
supervisors.  It would be ironic to deny enforcement of the 
Board's Order merely because the Home's egregious violations of 
the Act were perpetrated against individuals who subsequently 
were determined to be supervisors and thus not protected.  Such a 
conclusion would violate the spirit of the Act.  Thus, while 
17 
there is no precedent on this exact question, there are strong 
policy arguments that militate in favor of finding that the Board 
has jurisdiction to order reinstatement and backpay of 
supervisors in this type of situation.  These policy reasons, 
considered in tandem with the well-settled rule that the Board 
has jurisdiction to reinstate supervisors in instances where 
their discharge was accomplished to thwart the exercise of rights 
of protected employees, could support a conclusion that the Board 
has jurisdiction to order reinstatement and backpay to 
supervisors under these circumstances.  See, e.g., Oil City Brass 
Works v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 466, 471 (5th Cir. 1966) (ordering 
reinstatement of supervisor discharged for testifying before the 
Board on behalf of the union so as to ensure that "the overriding 
purpose of the Act [is not] frustrated.").  
 The Home engaged in deliberate conduct intended to 
discourage, prevent and punish union activity by those whom it 
believed were entitled to engage in such activity.  If subsequent 
events fortuitously rendered those employees not subject to the 
protection of the Act, the intentional wrongful conduct of their 
employers should not be without remedy.  However, because of our 
decision that the Home is barred from challenging the LPNs 
supervisory status in this appeal, we do not decide this issue. 
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny review of the 
Board's Decision and grant enforcement of the Board's Order. 
                           
